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Abstract
While various historians use Mass Observation sources to study popular engagement
with politics in the 1940s, they tend to rely on file reports summarizing research or
the writings of the national panel, which paid limited attention to how the public
engaged with key aspects of electioneering. By contrast, we re-examine Mass
Observation’s various election surveys to explore people’s assumptions about how
election campaigns should be conducted, the qualities looked for in political parties,
and their reflections on the records of governments. Our conclusions shed light on
the transformation of British public politics after 1918. During the interwar years
it became common thinking to assume that parties would centre their campaigning
around a detailed programme for government. Whereas Mass Observation’s employ-
ees often claimed that much of the public was apathetic about politics, a reanalysis of
the survey results indicates that many people were eager to be seen to be able to offer
a considered assessment of the veracity of the competing parties’ promises. Mass
Observation’s election studies were criticized for their supposed amateurism.
However, they offer richer insights into how the public engaged with party pro-
grammes than the quantitative surveys that came to dominate election studies in
the 1950s and beyond.
In 1937, people in Bolton received an unusual addition to the standard election
circulars. Three ‘non-party election addresses’ were distributed during that
year’s municipal elections, one featuring music-hall lyrics, another in the
form of a comic-strip, and the last resembling a football pools coupon. Each
sought to awaken the interest of the habitual non-voter. Recipients were
informed that as with doing the pools, choosing who to vote for required
skill and careful attention to past form: ‘Are you going to let the small minority
who are interested in politics decide on Monday, Nov. 1 who is going to
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govern – not only them but you for another three years?’1 While the leaflets
were printed by ‘Civic Responsibilities, Manchester’, their true source was
Mass Observation (MO), a social-investigation organization, which had estab-
lished an operation in Bolton (renamed as ‘Worktown’) earlier that year.
According to Tom Harrisson, the leader of the Worktown project, ‘the basic
assumption of these experiments was that the people were not positively
apathetic; that they failed to vote because the idea hadn’t been sold to
them’.2 The main political parties were largely to blame for this state of affairs
given that most of their election literature was unappealing to the eye, and full
of formulaic phrases and vague platitudes, far removed from the conventions
of everyday speech.3 Harrisson’s experiment appears to have been a success,
raising turnout on streets where the leaflets were distributed.4
While several historians use Mass Observation as a source to explore the
political culture of the 1940s, scholars have given little attention to how it
can help us understand how the public engaged with campaign literature.5
This article builds on the approach developed in David Cowan’s recent analysis
of the reception of Labour’s ‘Ask your Dad’ slogan in 1948–9. Cowan uses MO
survey data to study how people interacted with political campaigning, consid-
ering how their responses to the slogan were shaped by concerns and mindsets
inherited from earlier decades.6 Our reanalysis of Mass Observation’s election
survey data contributes to a growing literature which is re-examining the field
notes and survey data produced by mid-twentieth-century British social sci-
ence. To date, these studies have focused largely on re-reading sociologies of
class, whereas this article suggests that using this approach can also be useful
for understanding popular attitudes to politics.7 Our findings complement Jon
Lawrence’s argument that British public politics was transformed after 1918,
with the decline of hitherto common forms of rowdy and sensationalist elec-
tioneering.8 Campaign literature played a central role in shaping this more
1 The football pools leaflet is reprinted in Tom Harrisson, Britain revisited (London, 1961),
pp. 79–82; the music lyrics leaflet survives in the Worktown Collection (hereafter WC), 11-A/10.
2 Tom Harrisson undated notes [c. 1938], WC, 12-E/212.
3 Ibid., 12-E/205.
4 Harrisson, Britain revisited, p. 107.
5 Among the key studies are Steven Fielding, ‘What did “the people” want?: the meaning of the
1945 General Election’, Historical Journal, 35 (1992), pp. 623–39; Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson,
and Nick Tiratsoo, ‘England arise!’ The Labour party and popular politics in 1940s Britain (Manchester,
1995); Jonathan Moss, Nick Clarke, Will Jennings, and Gerry Stoker, ‘Golden age, apathy, or stealth?
Democratic engagement in Britain, 1945–50’, Contemporary British History, 30 (2016), pp. 441–62.
6 David Cowan, ‘The “progress of a slogan”: youth, culture, and the shaping of everyday political
languages in late 1940s Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, 29 (2018), pp. 435–58.
7 Key interventions include Mike Savage, ‘Working class identities in post-war Britain: revisiting
the affluent worker study’, Sociology, 39 (2005), pp. 929–46; Selina Todd, ‘Affluence, class and Crown
Street: re-investigating the post-war working class’, Contemporary British History, 22 (2008), pp. 501–
18; Jon Lawrence, Me, me, me: the search for community in post-war England (Oxford, 2019), chs. 2–5;
Adrian Bingham’s ongoing ‘Everyday politics, ordinary lives’ project is also using social survey data
to re-examine the role of politics in everyday life.
8 Jon Lawrence, ‘The transformation of British public politics after the First World War’, Past &
Present, 190 (2006), pp. 185–216, at pp. 185–6, 197–201.
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peaceable and supposedly rational politics. Finally, this article suggests that
the ‘valence model’ developed by the British Election Study over the last
fifty years, which stresses that voters make their judgements based on an
evaluation of a party’s performance rather than on class loyalties, is useful
for understanding British political culture in the 1940s.9
During the interwar years, it became common thinking to assume that par-
ties would centre their campaigning around a detailed programme for govern-
ment. Manifestos and election addresses became the key means for candidates
to outline the programme on which they stood. In January 1938, the Worktown
team produced their first detailed analysis of a by-election at Farnworth, near
Bolton. Labour held the seat following the death of the incumbent MP. During
the campaign, Harrisson noted that ‘first importance’ was attached to the elec-
tion address (the candidate’s personal manifesto), a document whose signifi-
cance eclipsed the well-established spectacles of the eve-of-poll meeting and
the billboard poster.10 Such thinking reflected a common assumption about
the post-1918 electorate: that most people were ‘silent voters’, who rarely
attended public meetings, did not follow politics closely, and lacked long-
standing party loyalties. A well-constructed election address was vital given
that it was assumed that voters would make up their minds based on what
they read at home.11 Or, as a draft for the unfinished MO book ‘Politics and
the non-voter’ put it: ‘The meeting is designed to interest only those suffi-
ciently interested to listen. The leaflet is designed to interest and influence
the otherwise unapproached nine-tenths of the electorate.’12
Voters were encouraged to weigh up the competing claims carefully, being
wary of gimmickry and loose promises, and mindful of governments’ past
records. The evidence collected by Mass Observation in election questionnaires
suggests that many people took this ideal to heart. Few paid detailed attention
to the introduction of policy initiatives outside of election campaigns, identi-
fied as partisans for a particular party, or discussed individual policies in depth
when responding to questionnaires. At times, these evasions were viewed by
MO’s employees as signs of political apathy or disinterest. And yet, a reanalysis
of the survey data indicates that many people were eager to be seen to be pol-
itically engaged and able to offer a considered assessment of the veracity of the
competing parties’ promises.
From 1937 onwards, Mass Observation collected thoughts on people’s
engagement with elections in a variety of forms including questionnaires,
responses to panel directives, the writing of election diaries, interviews with
candidates and agents, observations at meetings, and overheard conversations.
The challenges of engaging with this broad range of evidence helps explain
9 For a historical examination of the valence model, see Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders,
Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, Political choice in Britain (Oxford, 2004).
10 Tom Harrisson, ‘The purpose of politics’ [misc. file], WC, 12-E/228. The term ‘election address’
is used throughout this article to refer to the written address issued by candidates at the start of an
election campaign.
11 Frank Gray, Confessions of a candidate (London, 1925), p. 19; Henry Houston and Lionel Valdar,
Modern electioneering practice (London, 1922), pp. 19, 21; Lawrence, ‘Transformation’, p. 205.
12 ‘Writing’, WC, 6-A/123.
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why historians have come to such differing conclusions about what MO sources
can tell us about British political culture in the 1940s.
Steven Fielding has used Mass Observation file reports, which summarized
survey data with a view to later use in publications, to suggest that much of the
public took little interest in politics. While Labour’s promise of full employ-
ment and social security was widely popular, he argues that the public lacked
enthusiasm for more radical social change.13 In an important critique of this
work, James Hinton claims that Fielding and his co-authors take observations
about political apathy recorded by MO staff in their file reports at face value. In
doing so, they neglect to consider how people’s evasiveness when questioned
about their political opinions could be the result of their discomfort with party
political discourses or their defence of alternative ideas. Moreover, this
approach pays little sustained attention to how the apparently ‘apathetic’ pol-
itical mood of the 1940s compared with earlier or later periods. As Hinton sug-
gests, far from the public having little time for party politics, the 1950 and
1951 elections were characterized by high levels of turnout compared to inter-
war elections.14
Jonathan Moss, Nick Clarke, Will Jennings, and Gerry Stoker have since
sought to gain an unmediated view of public engagement with politics by
exploring the ‘raw data’ produced by volunteer writers for Mass Observation
between 1945 and 1950. They suggest that while voting was widely seen as a
key duty in a democratic society, there was widespread frustration with the
‘mud slinging’ of party politics and a desire for government by experts, with
independence being a prized quality amongst candidates.15 However, directive
responses only offer a partial understanding of how the public engaged with
elections. While panellists were asked to collect election literature, they
were not encouraged to offer their own reflections on this material. By con-
trast, the May–June 1945 directive asked for opinions on any political meetings
that panellists had attended, so it is unsurprising that discussion of meetings
featured prominently in replies.16
Most recently, in an important intervention, Cowan has analysed Mass
Observation’s survey of responses to Labour’s ‘Ask your Dad’ slogan in 1948–
9. The campaign sought to compare the Attlee government’s record favourably
with the widespread deprivation experienced under the Conservative-
dominated National Governments of the 1930s. Cowan highlights how those
surveyed by MO did not passively consume the Labour slogan or defer to
13 Fielding, ‘What did “the people” want?’, pp. 623–9, 637; Fielding, Thompson, and Tiratsoo,
‘England arise!’, pp. 212–13; Fielding’s conclusions have been largely supported by Kevin Jefferys,
Politics and the people: a history of British democracy since 1918 (London, 2007), pp. 77–8, 80–1, 112.
14 James Hinton, ‘1945 and the apathy school’, History Workshop Journal, 43 (1997), pp. 266–73, at
pp. 267–70. Effective turnout at the 1950 and 1951 elections was likely to have been significantly
higher than the official figures given they were fought on old registers, Jon Lawrence, Electing our
masters: the hustings in British politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford, 2009), p. 138.
15 Moss, Clarke, Jennings, and Stoker, ‘Golden age, apathy, or stealth?’, pp. 442–3, 450, 452–3.
16 Will Jennings, Jonathan Moss, and Gerry Stoker, ‘Changing spaces of political encounter and
the rise of anti-politics: evidence from Mass Observation’s General Election diaries’, Political
Geography, 56 (2017), pp. 13–23, at pp. 16–17.
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‘expert’ opinion; rather, they could rework it based on their own memories. A
reluctance to engage with the slogan did not necessarily indicate political
ignorance, in fact, it could be based on different memories of the 1930s, dis-
trust towards party wire-pullers, and enthusiasm for political independence.17
While Mass Observation’s election surveys may not offer such consistently
rich insights into political memory, they do provide a unique resource amount-
ing to several hundred interviews demonstrating how people engaged with
various facets of campaigning. The following article is based on a comprehen-
sive analysis of the surviving survey data and accompanying field notes col-
lected in the Mass Observation election Topic Collections. An introductory
section contextualizes MO’s election studies by exploring debates about the
appropriate use of election literature in the 1920s and 1930s. This was a period
when programmatic politics grew in influence, due largely to the influence of
Labour. There were, however, countervailing pressures. Politicians commonly
warned against the need to avoid rash promises, a rhetorical strategy adopted
most keenly by the Conservatives. The second section analyses the main con-
stituency election questionnaires conducted by Mass Observation between
1938 and 1947. We conclude with an analysis of Mass Observation’s most ambi-
tious survey of public opinion, the 1950 General Election survey, conducted
across six London constituencies.18 Only a small fraction of the survey data fea-
tured in MO’s publications and much of it was only briefly summarized in file
reports.
There are methodological challenges with using this material, as Mass
Observation noted at the time. While MO collected huge amounts of evidence
of the vernacular forms which people used to discuss politics, it paid little
attention to analysing it. Surviving field notes provide few clues regarding
the nature of the inter-personal dynamics of the interview process, and survey
methods often appear to have been haphazard. In 1938, Harrisson and his team
conducted a survey on relative interest in home and foreign affairs during the
West Fulham by-election. The answers recorded by interviewers varied signifi-
cantly. This was seen as largely a result of the interviewer’s technique, ‘as peo-
ple got into the swing of the job’ refusals apparently became less common.
Nonetheless, MO regularly found that women were less likely to provide
detailed answers than men.19 When Mass Observation conducted a survey of
opinions on the Labour pamphlet Your Britain, during the Farnworth
by-election the same year, some of the interviewers posed as Labour canvas-
sers and others as Conservatives. People were more likely to give a favourable
view of Your Britain if they thought they were speaking to a Conservative, while
they were more likely to be sceptical about the promises made in the leaflet if
they assumed they were addressing a Labour activist.20 The overall results,
17 Cowan, ‘The “progress of a slogan”’, pp. 435–6, 452–4, 456–7.
18 Mass Observation conducted further election surveys in 1951 and 1955. However, just the sur-
vey sheets survive for the former. The 1955 survey had a substantially different set of questions,
none of which asked respondents directly for their views on election propaganda.
19 ‘Home or foreign affairs’ (26 March), n.d. [1938], Topic Collection (hereafter TC), 46-2-C/1157,
Fulham West, 6 Apr. 1938.
20 ‘Writing’, p. 12, WC, 6-A/103.
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therefore, need to be viewed with caution. Nonetheless, they also indicate that
many of those interviewed took some interest in politics and were desirous to
provide the parties with feedback based on common assumptions about their
main faults. Labour’s opponents often attacked its supposedly rash promises,
while the Conservatives were criticized for their reluctance to commit to a
substantial reform programme. A more insuperable problem was ongoing dis-
trust of the motives of Mass Observation’s staff, given many of those conduct-
ing the surveys were outsiders and drawn from the higher social classes.
During the anxious days of spring 1940, some of those interviewed in
by-election surveys even assumed that Mass Observation’s staff were con-
nected with the British Union of Fascists (BUF), who ran several candidates
until their organization was banned in May 1940.21
Mass Observation’s election surveys were crudely designed and consist
largely of ‘public opinion’, rather than the more candid ‘private opinion’
revealed in overheard conversations and panel responses. The sample base
also varies significantly over time. Funding from the Labour party enabled
Mass Observation to undertake by-election surveys in Farnworth and West
Fulham in 1938. Financial difficulties meant that similar surveys were not con-
ducted until early 1940, when MO received further funding from the Ministry
of Information. However, wartime election surveys focused chiefly on ques-
tions of war morale. Paper restrictions after May 1940 meant there was little
interest in questioning the public about the documentary forms of election
campaigning. Ongoing money worries led MO to confine their post-1945 elec-
tion surveys to London and the surrounding region. Nonetheless, the discur-
sive forms in which the public responded to questions about election
programmes remained consistent across these elections. Those surveyed
tended to discuss their judgements of the competing programmes on the
basis of past records and general assessments of whether promises for future
action were realistic – often to the frustration of interviewers keen to probe
their views on specific policies. Sensationalist forms of campaigning, which
had flourished before 1918, were to be distrusted and this accounts for most
of the criticisms of ‘mud slinging’ recorded in these surveys.
Mass Observation’s election surveys provide unique insights into the nor-
mative assumptions about how elections should be conducted, the qualities
looked for in political parties, and reflections on the records of governments.22
Whereas directives rarely asked the national MO panel to reflect on the docu-
mentary forms of election literature they received, the election surveys con-
tain an array of comments on manifestos, leaflets, and addresses. Many
replies were admittedly vague and cursory, which may have been because
interviewers treated this as a question of secondary importance. In Voters’
choice, its brief report on the 1950 election survey, Mass Observation (keen
21 Middleton and Prestwich by-election, 22 May 1940, File Report (hereafter FR) 154, p. a. The
BUF was banned the day after the by-election.
22 Tom Harrisson made this distinction at the time, see his article ‘What is public opinion?’,
Political Quarterly, Aug. 1940, FR 361; James Hinton, The mass-observers: a history, 1937–1949 (Oxford,
2013), p. 187.
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to win business from party research departments) claimed that most people
paid superficial attention to election literature and this was particularly true
of doubtful voters.23 However, a reanalysis of the 1950 survey and the other
election questionnaires that MO produced indicates much keener interest in
the parties’ competing programmes than these conclusions suggest.
By the early 1950s, the method of election surveying pioneered by Tom
Harrisson, with its emphasis on qualitative, empirical research and recording
colloquial speech, was dying out. Mass Observation’s 1950 election survey
findings were, in fact, never analysed in detail. By then, MO’s work was effect-
ively overshadowed by competing survey organizations who offered sup-
posedly more scientific methods for understanding the voter’s choice. Rival
surveys focused on producing representative quantitative samples of public
opinion (the results of which could be sold to newspapers and party
research departments). Little attention was paid to how the public engaged
with specific documentary forms of campaigning or of the language they
used to articulate their attitudes towards politicians. Original sample data
for these rival 1950–1 surveys does not appear to have survived. Therefore,
for all their idiosyncrasies, Mass Observation’s surveys ultimately provide
the historian with richer insights into how the public responded to the trans-
formation of public politics after 1918 and the growth of programmatic polit-
ics, spearheaded by Labour.
I
In the run-up to the 1924 General Election, a Labour official was quoted in The
Observer outlining his plans for the contest:
Our posters are going to be in marked contrast to the trivialities of the
other side and more artistic. We shall have more photography and less
cartoon. The points of the [Labour] Government programme will be
emphasised: the work it has done and was planning to do when it was
interrupted. Our posters will include a group photograph of the
Ministers…most of our literature is ready for issue, and we have no old
‘dope’; it is concerned entirely with the work of the Government.24
In making this claim, the official was seeking to distance Labour from
old-fashioned, sensational forms of electioneering (see Figure 1).
Over recent years, a number of efforts had been made to curb the old ‘dope’
and create more peaceable forms of public politics. The Representation of the
People Act (RPA) 1918 included measures to prevent non-party organizations
from spending money during campaigns without contributing to a candidate’s
expenses. These organizations had been responsible for many of the more sen-
sationalist posters and lurid election stunts of the Edwardian years, using this
loophole to enable candidates to spend well in excess of the official spending
23 Mass-Observation, Voters’ choice: a Mass-Observation report on the General Election of 1950 (London,
1950), p. 5.
24 ‘The lightning campaign’, Observer, 12 Oct. 1924, p. 13.
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limits.25 In endorsing the clause of the bill preventing expenses by unauthor-
ized persons, Sir George Younger, chairman of the Conservative party, claimed
its purpose was to ‘prevent the practice of many newspapers and certain
advertising agencies of booming particular candidates by contents bills, car-
toons, and posting free copies of papers’.26 The RPA further sought to facilitate
calmer elections by allowing candidates to send one election communication
Figure 1. Labour election poster, 1924. University of Bristol Special Collections: DM2641/76,
Geoffrey Ford Poster Collection.
25 David Thackeray, Conservatism for the democratic age: Conservative cultures and the challenge of
mass politics in early twentieth century England (Manchester, 2013), p. 117; James Thompson,
‘“Pictorial lies”? – posters and politics in Britain c. 1880–1914’, Past & Present, 197 (2007),
pp. 177–210.
26 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 99, 16 Aug. 1917, col. 1425.
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by free post. It was assumed that this communication would include the elec-
tion address – enabling candidates to provide details of their programme to all
households in the constituency.27
Despite these measures, sensationalist forms of electioneering persisted.
During the 1922 election, a series of Conservative leaflets used cartoons to
gruesomely outline the horrors that socialism had inflicted on Russia, instruct-
ing Britons to avoid a similar fate by voting Conservative. One pamphlet
showed graphic illustrations of emaciated families living a wretched existence
under Soviet tyranny, with the slogan: ‘This is what socialism means in Russia,
keep it out of Britain by voting for the Conservative and Unionist candidate.’28
The observations of the Labour official do, however, indicate that the use of
such scare tactics was under challenge. From its inception, Labour had distin-
guished itself from its opponents by centring its election campaigns around a
manifesto, which laid out a programme for reform.29 This approach stemmed,
in part, from its concerns with avoiding misrepresentations of its policies from
an overwhelmingly hostile national press, which often focused on figures on
the extremes of the labour movement.30 By the late 1920s, Labour’s appeal
was centred on the promotion of a national programme and the party’s candi-
dates increasingly came to be selected with a national audience in mind.31 By
offering a detailed programme for government, the relative newcomer sought
to challenge anti-socialist scaremongering and present itself as a credible party
of government.32
Labour’s appeal to the nation, the party’s 1929 election manifesto, was an
important landmark in the advance of programmatic politics – not least
because Labour won the largest number of seats for the first time. It included
a section ‘No pledges we cannot fulfil’, which stated that ‘we shall not deceive
the people by saying that the task of National and Social Reconstruction is
easy, or that it can be accomplished in a day or a year’. This was a clear rebuke
to Lloyd George’s well-publicized recent claim that the Liberals could deal with
the unemployment crisis within a year by establishing a programme of public
works.33 References to the manifesto featured prominently in speeches and
print propaganda. Constituency organizations purchased nearly nine million
copies of the Labour manifesto, a figure that the Conservatives came close
27 Lawrence, Electing our masters, p. 110.
28 Conservative Party Archive (hereafter CPA), microfiche, 0.396.220, ‘This is what socialism
means in Russia’ (1922/102); see also ‘Socialism has reduced Russia to the depths of despair’
(1922/101).
29 David Thackeray and Richard Toye, ‘An age of promises: British election manifestos and
addresses 1900–97’, Twentieth Century British History, 31 (2020), pp. 1–26, at p. 9.
30 For the acrimonious relationship between Labour and the capitalist press, see Laura Beers,
‘Education or manipulation? Labour, democracy, and the popular press in interwar Britain’,
Journal of British Studies, 48 (2009), pp. 129–52, at pp. 136–42.
31 Malcolm Petrie, ‘“Contests of vital importance”: by-elections, the Labour party, and the
reshaping of British radicalism, 1924–1929’, Historical Journal, 60 (2017), pp. 121–48, at pp. 121,
125, 145.
32 Francis Williams, Fifty years march: the rise of the Labour party (London, 1949), p. 330.
33 F. W. S. Craig, ed., General Election manifestos 1900–1974 (London, 1975), p. 85.
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to matching.34 Labour and the nation, the programme that provided the inspiration
for the manifesto, featured in a poster depicting Ramsay MacDonald being inter-
viewed by John Bull for the job of prime minister (see Figure 2). The programme
acted as MacDonald’s résumé, being the basis on which voters should judge his
party.
Figure 2. ‘General Manager Wanted’, Labour election poster, 1929, Mundaneum Collection, Mons,
ARC-MUNDA-AFF-R1-144.
34 Laura Beers, Your Britain: media and the making of the Labour party (Cambridge, MA, 2010),
p. 125. During the same election, the Conservatives distributed 8.3 million copies of their mani-
festo: John Barnes and Richard Cockett, ‘The making of party policy’, in Anthony Seldon and
Stuart Ball, eds., Conservative century: the Conservative party since 1900 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 547–82,
at p. 557.
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Stanley Baldwin’s 1929 election address, which doubled as the Conservative
manifesto, was in some ways a landmark in the party’s enthusiasm for pro-
grammatic politics. However, the stress was on Baldwin’s record. There were
to be ‘no spectacular promises for a sudden transformation of our social or
industrial conditions’.35 Rather, ‘it is for the electors to judge, in the light of
our past record, whether we have not faithfully redeemed the promises
which we made four and a half years ago’.36 Baldwin’s opponents, it was
claimed, could not be trusted to keep their promises. One poster, making ref-
erence to a well-known popular song, showed Labour’s Ramsay MacDonald and
the Liberal leader David Lloyd George blowing bubbles marked ‘promises’.
There were two captions: ‘So pretty! Till they burst!’ and ‘They’re for ever
blowing bubbles.’37
The approach failed in 1929, with Labour taking power, but was employed
again thereafter. At the 1931 election, the Labour party was swept away,
accused of having run away from its responsibilities when faced with an
economic crisis. One poster showed an aged working (or perhaps workless)
man looking up, disillusioned, from his copy of the Labour-supporting Daily
Herald. The legend ran: ‘No more socialist promises for me, I’m voting
Conservative this time.’38 The technique was repeated in 1935, when socialist
promises were presented as the bait that threatened to lure a workman into
a trap.39
Labour pioneered programmatic politics then, but it had not yet got it down
to a fine art. Indeed, its hastily written 1935 manifesto presented an easy tar-
get for critics. The Times noted that the first half consisted of attacks on the
National Government, whereas ‘the much vaunted “programme of action”’ –
i.e. the 1934 policy document For socialism and peace –was squeezed into just
one paragraph, presumably as a ploy to distract voters from its more contro-
versial policies.40 Mass Observation started its activities at a time when pro-
grammatic politics was well established but also when there was widespread
unease about the escalation of election promises. The Conservatives had
achieved success in 1931 and 1935 suggesting that Labour’s manifestos were
untrustworthy, obscuring the more radical measures outlined in their longer
programmes adopted by Conference, which they were likely to enact if given
a parliamentary majority.
35 Craig, ed., General Election manifestos 1900–1974, p. 70.
36 Ibid., p. 80.
37 Bodleian Library POSTER 1929-28; for criticisms of Lloyd George’s broken promises between
1918 and 1922, see also Bodleian Library POSTER 1929-3; ‘Performances not promises: Mr.
Stanley Baldwin’s great election speech at Drury Lane Theatre, April 18th, 1929’, CPA, leaflet
1929/192, microfiche.
38 Bodleian Library POSTER 1931-2. On the theme of Labour’s broken promises, see also Bodleian
Library POSTER 1913-13 and the Conservative election film ‘The right spirit’, available at https://
player.bfi.org.uk/free/film/watch-the-right-spirit-1931-online (consulted 15 Apr. 2020).
39 Bodleian Library POSTER 1935-19.
40 ‘The socialists’ plain van’, Times, 4 Nov. 1935, p. 13.
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II
In ‘Swelling the Labour vote’, a play for amateur dramatic groups offering an
amusing take on the goings on in a municipal election campaign, Tom
Harrisson drew on his experiences analysing elections in London and
Lancashire in the late 1930s. Both the Conservative and Labour committee
rooms are presented as taking great interest in the preparation of the election
address. The Tories use the best ‘cream vellum’ paper while Labour agonize
over the wording. In the end, the Labour address amounts to little more
than a long-winded and sonorous commitment to avoid making unrealistic
promises and to conscientiously serve the interests of the ward. The narrator
interjects: ‘This is taken from a typical election address. It is meaningless, ful-
some, and no damned good.’41
While Harrisson was frustrated by the standard format of much election lit-
erature, Mass Observation’s early studies noted that some publications were
beginning to break the mould, with Labour taking on the role of innovator.
The Your Britain series of pamphlets came in for particular attention. In
1937, Labour’s immediate programme had been endorsed by the party’s confer-
ence; it was notable for focusing on outlining policies which a Labour govern-
ment would introduce in a single term if given a parliamentary majority and
offered much more concrete plans for their implementation than previous pro-
grammes.42 The first edition of Your Britain sought to present the key points
from the Immediate programme in an attractive manner, making heavy use of
colour and photography. This sixteen-page publication resembled the format
of Picture Post, the highly popular photojournalism magazine launched the fol-
lowing year. Your Britain was launched in time for the autumn 1937 municipal
elections and sought to demonstrate how a future Labour administration would
build on its achievements in local government. Its front and back covers fea-
tured photos of new London County Council housing estates (Labour had
held power at municipal level in the capital since 1934). Local party organiza-
tions purchased over 600,000 copies, far above the numbers expected of a party
publication outside an election year.43
MO’s Farnworth election study in January 1938 suggested that people paid
far more attention to Your Britain than any of the other literature they
received, with around 80 per cent of the electorate reading the pamphlet.44
Conservatives sought to present Your Britain and the Labour candidate’s elec-
tion address as an attempt to mislead impressionistic voters with gimmickry
and wild spending plans. At one meeting a speaker asked his audience:
41 TC, 46–2-A/807–9, Fulham West, 6 Apr. 1938.
42 Andrew Thorpe, A history of the British Labour party (2nd edn, Basingstoke, 2000), p. 86;
Williams, Fifty years march, p. 347.
43 Beers, Your Britain, p. 159.
44 This estimate was based on eighty-one interviews. All of those who had received Your Britain
claimed to have read it, ‘Writing’, WC, 6-A, 102, 105. By contrast, only 31 per cent of those surveyed
in the Great Lever ward of Bolton by Mass Observation during the 1937 municipal elections had
read the election addresses, ‘Writing’, WC, 6-A/108.
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Have you seen the booklet issued by the Labour Party? Very interesting
and appeals to the eye. But my friends, do not be gulled by the rash pro-
mises and colourful pictures depicted in that book. The Nat[ional]
Gov[ernment] can offer you far greater attractions than anything
portrayed in that book…The Labour Party always proposed to deal with
other people’s money and not their own. On the outside cover is a beau-
tiful house that you ought to live in. Just a moment look what the
Nat[ional] Gov[ernmen]t has done in respect to housing.45
In fact, Mass Observation found that most people were receptive to Your Britain.
Of those who had received it, 87 per cent deemed it alright or very good; 5 per
cent expressed sceptical comments, along the lines that the vision of Britain
would be nice ‘if it were true’.46 When prompted for their thoughts on the
scenes of the London County Council housing estate on the front and back
cover, most comments were favourable but some were unconvinced, with
comments such as ‘Look happy enough, but are they real photos?’47
Mass Observation undertook a similar survey during the West Fulham
by-election in April 1938 sponsored by the Labour party, who wished to
gauge reactions to the recently released Your Britain No. 2, which focused on
foreign policy. MO asked 141 people to give an opinion on Labour’s ‘new sheets’
(the election address, Your Britain, and a newspaper-style broadsheet). Rather
than focusing on the appeal of particular issues, most answers offered a gen-
eral comment on whether they found the party’s promises convincing as a
whole. Some who had read both Conservative and Labour addresses expressed
a preference for the former, based on the failings of the last Labour govern-
ment. These respondents also suggested that Labour’s smartly presented
literature sought to gull impressionable voters: (M18) ‘Labour makes promises
which it is impossible to carry out…Picture on the labour to catch the women…
How are they going to get the money for their reforms. More unemployment
in 1931. Conservatives haven’t promised so much. And so may be able to carry
out their promises.’ (W60) ‘Well illustrated which made it worth reading. [Your
Britain] should make a big impression on illiterate people. Intelligent person
soon pick holes in it.’48 Despite these sceptical comments, Your Britain No. 2
was favourably received in Fulham overall, although Mass Observation found
that significantly fewer people had read it than those surveyed in Farnworth
when the first edition had been recently released.49 This relative lack of inter-
est partly stemmed from the focus of the West Fulham campaign. Whereas it
45 Report of Conservative meeting, All Saints, 18 Jan. 1938, WC, 7-D/374–5; ‘Writing’, WC, 6-A/
106. Similar criticisms were made by Conservative speakers in Aberdeen, who claimed that Your
Britain contained attractive pictures and striking promises but a lack of detail on how reforms
would be paid for, ‘The socialist policy’, Aberdeen Journal, 11 Dec. 1937, p. 8.
46 ‘Writing’, WC, 6-A/105.
47 Ibid.
48 TC, 46-2-C/1177, 1349, Fulham, West, 6 Apr. 1938.
49 46 per cent of those interviewed claimed to have read Your Britain No. 2, 59 per cent made
‘positively favourable comments’, ‘Writing’, WC, 6-A/106; 15 per cent said they had no intention
of reading it, TC, 46-2-C/1320.
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was widely assumed that foreign affairs would dominate the by-election, Edith
Summerskill, the Labour candidate, concentrated more heavily on domestic
issues in the last week, which appears to have contributed to her victory.50
Although Mass Observation made studies of subsequent by-elections, it did
not attempt an election survey on the scale of the Farnworth and West Fulham
operations until February 1940, when it examined two London by-elections,
Southwark Central and Silvertown, the latter was the first project for which
it received funding from the Ministry of Information. However, MO’s efforts
to gain a clearer understanding of how the public engaged with election litera-
ture during these early wartime by-elections were hampered by the sheer vol-
ume of it produced by candidates. At Southwark Central, the question that
received the vaguest answers was ‘Which do you think is the best circular or
leaflet?’ This was unsurprising given that many people had been ‘swamped’
with leaflets.51 In nearby Silvertown, it was estimated that the average home
received around thirty pieces of literature.52
Mass Observation undertook their most ambitious wartime by-election sur-
vey at North-East Leeds in March 1940. The contest was won overwhelmingly
by John Henderson (Conservative), who took 97 per cent of the vote, against a
Fascist, Sydney Allen. Over 500 doorstep interviews took place and this is the
earliest MO election survey where large numbers of the original questionnaires
survive.53 According to the file report, most people lacked interest in the cam-
paign: ‘under half said they had read any of the [literature] with interest’ with
many feeling that too much was being produced.54 Nonetheless, the question-
naires offered a more ambiguous set of responses than the file report’s brief
conclusions imply. Interviewees were asked: ‘Are you or aren’t you interested
in the election leaflets that are pushed through your letter-box? Do you or
don’t you read them.’ From the responses, it is not always clear which of
the questions voters were responding to, with many brief answers. Some
appear to have assumed that they were being asked about the literature pro-
duced by the BUF candidate, which, combined with a widespread dislike of
by-elections taking place during wartime, may explain the large numbers
who expressed hostility to the leaflets.55 Typical replies include: (F50D) ‘Just
glanced it. I don’t know why it should, because I am anti-fascist’ and (F25C)
‘Lots of rubbish. Who wants Fascists anyway.’56 Allen’s election address
included various inflammatory statements such as his claim that the war
50 Report on West Fulham by-election, March 1938, FR A7.
51 TC, 46-3-E/2350, Southwark Central, 10 Feb. 1940; Searson, the ‘Labour, anti-war’ candidate
printed 116,000 leaflets, including 36,000 copies of his election address, only 8,217 votes were
cast in the by-election, TC, 46-E-H/2719.
52 Silvertown by-election, 29 Feb. 1940, FR 39, p. 18.
53 The Farnworth and Fulham by-election studies are discussed in Mass Observation, Britain by
Mass-Observation (London, 1939), pp. 42, 46–9, 54–6, 64–5. They also feature heavily in the surviving
drafts of the ‘Politics and the non-voter’ manuscript. It is likely that only material deemed useful
for these book projects survived in the Mass Observation archive.
54 North-East Leeds by-election, FR 59, pp. 17–18.
55 Ibid., p. 4.
56 TC, 46-5-B/4036, 4042.
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was ‘no quarrel of the British people: this is a quarrel of Jewish finance’.57
Around two-thirds of respondents who gave a definite answer claimed to
have read at least one of the election leaflets (this includes several who said
they were hostile to the literature or not interested).58
While more modest surveys were conducted at subsequent by-elections,
they tended to focus more on questions of war morale rather than how people
responded to election literature (although in April 1940 it was noted that small
boys had made paper aeroplanes out of one of the Battersea North candidate’s
election addresses after they were unwisely given copies to distribute).59 After
May 1940, the torrent of by-election literature dried up as the result of a paper
shortage and a need to preserve space in merchant shipping. Thereafter, can-
didates made a virtue of their moderate and economical output of election
leaflets.60 Ultimately, the conditions of wartime, when people were at first
flooded with election literature then starved of it, did not enable Mass
Observation to continue the detailed analysis of party political literature
which it had pioneered in its analysis of the Your Britain pamphlets.
III
Mass Observation’s surveys during the 1945 General Election were confined to
a detailed questionnaire in East Fulham (396 respondents) and a survey which
focused on reactions to Churchill’s and Attlee’s first election radio broadcasts
with 192 respondents drawn from various regions of London (Chelsea,
Hampstead, Fulham, Harlesden, Hammersmith). These surveys provided the
main basis for MO’s 140-page file report on the election, which has been
used to suggest that the electorate was ‘dispirited’ and apathetic, with many
paying little attention to the campaign.61 However, a detailed analysis of
Mass Observation’s survey questionnaires indicates that this apparent apathy
resulted from frustration at the conduct of the election rather than a broader
disinterest in politics.62 In fact, the results suggest a general lack of cynicism,
with widespread confidence that the next government would be able to enact
significant social reforms.
While MO’s election file report made reference to low morale, this largely
resulted from the controversial early radio broadcasts by the party leaders.63
In particular, there was widespread hostility to Churchill’s claim that Labour
would have to ‘fall back on some form of Gestapo’ to enact its proposed reforms
57 TC, 46-5-D/4382.
58 Around two-thirds of those who gave a positive response claimed to have read at least one of
the election leaflets, TC, 46-5-B, Leeds, North-East, 13 Mar. 1940.
59 TC, 46-6-A/4676.
60 Middleton and Prestwich by-election, 22 May 1940, FR 154, p. 7; Newcastle [North] by-election,
7 June 1940, FR 195, p. 13; Northampton by-election, 6 Dec. 1940, FR 552, p. 4.
61 Fielding, ‘What did “the people” want’, p. 632.
62 The BIPO similarly found widespread frustration at the conduct of the election campaign, as a
result of ‘mud slinging’ and scare stories, Nick Clarke, Will Jennings, Jonathan Moss, and Gerry
Stoker, The good politician: folk theories, political interaction, and the rise of anti-politics (Cambridge,
2018), p. 93.
63 ‘A report on the General Election, June–July 1945’, p. 4, FR 2268.
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if given power. As Richard Toye notes, Labour was also not above accusing its
opponents of employing Fascist methods at this time.64 These exchanges were
a major reason why Mass Observation recorded so many criticisms of ‘mud
slinging’ during the election campaign, a phenomenon which has unfairly
been seen as representative of popular attitudes to party politics in the latter
half of the 1940s more broadly.65 Criticism of Churchill’s speech stemmed froma
sense that he was engaging in an outdated form of sensationalist electioneering,
which masked his party’s lack of an appealing programme. A panellist from
Dewsbury quoted in the file report had little time for Churchill’s attacks on his
wartime colleagues: (F40C) ‘I wouldn’t call it a thoughtful or an instructive
speech, but rather an old-fashioned election speech, ranting and abusive. But
haven’t ordinary people got a bit beyond that? Haven’t they grown up since
1906?66 As a young Liberal MP, Churchill had benefited from the notorious
‘Chinese Slavery’ election cry in 1906, which caused a sensation when lurid pos-
ters appeared presenting indentured Chinese labourers working in barbaric con-
ditions in South Africa. Further criticisms were recorded in the London survey
conducted in the days following Churchill’s and Attlee’s opening radio broad-
casts. Typical comments included: (M30C) ‘On the whole a soap box speech.
Mr. Churchill didn’t set out the Conservative Party’s aims, but gave an unjustified
attack on the other partys [sic].’ (M30C) ‘He didn’t state a definite programme. He
seems to be relying on the fact that he’s a great war leader. Which isn’t fair.’67
Over 80 per cent of those interviewed expressed hostility to the Gestapo speech
or felt it more bad than good; only 12 per cent were explicitly favourable.68
While the 1945 election has retrospectively been viewed as an indicator of
growing political apathy, Tom Harrisson drew quite a different conclusion at
the time. Writing in Political Quarterly in September 1945, he noted a ‘compara-
tive absence of cynicism’ compared to previous by-elections. This, he claimed,
stemmed from ‘the restrained programmes’ put forward by Labour and the
Conservatives, ‘neither indulged in wild promises’.69 Let us face the future was
subsequently attacked by its critics as a ‘sinister’ and radical pamphlet but
at the time it attracted little critical comment.70 When East Fulham voters
were asked whether they thought the next government would be able to
‘do just what you want’ on the key issues (housing was identified overwhelm-
ingly as the main priority of those interviewed), 60 per cent said they would or
probably would.71 Although Churchill’s leadership was a key attraction for
64 Richard Toye, The roar of the lion: the untold story of Churchill’s World War II speeches (Oxford,
2013), pp. 209–10, 220.
65 FR 2268, pp. 4, 10. For the idea that Mass Observation evidence demonstrates widespread frus-
tration with ‘mud slinging’ during the latter half of the 1940s, see Moss, Clarke, Jennings, and
Stoker, ‘Golden age, apathy, or stealth?’, pp. 442, 450, 452–3.
66 FR 2268, p. 14.
67 TC, 76-3-E/1923, 1927.
68 TC, 76-3-E/1900.
69 FR 2282, p. 7.
70 For the supposedly sinister qualities of Let us face the future, see Quintin Hogg, The case for
Conservatism (London, 1947), p. 160.
71 FR 2265, ‘General Election’, p. 10.
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Conservative voters, people otherwise made their decisions on who to vote for
based on perceptions of who would keep their promises.72 The East Fulham
survey contained the question ‘How do you feel about the election propaganda
at this election?’, which elicited many disapproving comments about ‘dirt’ and
‘mud slinging’. However, the MO report was cautious about drawing conclu-
sions from these results. Unlike the 1950 survey, there was no question that
asked respondents specifically for their views on election literature – so the
critical comments covered various facets of the campaign.73 In particular,
many demonstrated frustration at the behaviour of national leaders or
expressed hostility to the election being fought on an old register while
Britain was still at war with Japan.74
A ‘Postscript’ to MO’s General Election file report written in April 1946 con-
cluded that the election campaign had little effect on people’s voting inten-
tions; ‘they voted on the long-term reputation of their party, an impression
built up over many years’.75 Nonetheless, this did not mean that most people
were uninterested in the party’s key policies, rather than the particular
circumstances of the time meant that they were already well known when
the campaign started.76 Churchill’s Declaration of policy to the electors made vari-
ous allusions to policies, which had been outlined in his ‘Four Years’ Plan’
broadcast of 1943, and subsequent white papers.77 Similarly, Let us face the
future drew heavily on well-established Labour policies and principles, many
of which had been adopted by the party before the war as part of its
Immediate programme.78 In many ways, Labour’s triumph in 1945 rested on
their ability to make this programme appear more credible than it had been
before the war.
While it has often been used as a source for exploring changing attitudes to
the Attlee governments, Mass Observation’s election activities after 1945 were
modest in scope and confined to London and surrounding regions. They only
attempted one more large-scale by-election questionnaire, at Battersea in July
1946, which demonstrated widespread hostility towards politicians on account
of distrust towards both the major parties.79 Typical comments quoted in the
file report included: (M35C) ‘Remains to be seen…promises…they forget about
it when they get in’, (M60C) ‘You don’t get results, just as it was in the last elec-
tion.’80 And yet, while the report concluded that for many election literature
was ‘just not worth bothering about, a waste of paper’, the survey results
72 FR 2265, p. 12; TC, 76-2-I, 1074.
73 FR 2265, pp. 16–18. The alternative wording, ‘How do you feel about the way elections are
run?’ was used in some interviews.
74 See for example TC, 76-2-J/1096, 1097, 1114, 1126–7, 1138, 1233.
75 ‘Postscript 1946 – General Election and after’, TC, 76-3-H, 2134. Similar claims were made in a
Tom Harrisson article, which appeared in Political Quarterly in September 1945, FR 2282, p. 5.
76 ‘Postscript 1946’.
77 Craig, ed., General Election manifestos 1900–1974, p. 115.
78 ‘Notes of the week’, Economist, 28 Apr. 1945; ‘The Labour programme’, New Statesman & Nation,
28 Apr. 1945.
79 357 people were interviewed for the survey, FR 2410, p. 8.
80 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
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suggested more equivocal results. Only 23 per cent of Labour voters and 14 per
cent of Conservative voters stated that they were not interested in the election
literature. The equivalent figure for non-voters was 25 per cent.81
Subsequent attempts by Mass Observation to gain sponsorship from the
Conservatives and Labour to conduct research into the appeal of their national
propaganda efforts had limited success. The Conservative party commissioned
MO to produce a report into responses to its Industrial Charter. Launched in
May 1947, the Charter was a major policy document, seeking to reconcile
the Conservatives with the key economic and social reforms introduced by
the Attlee government and committing the party to a mixed economy.
However, MO’s investigations suggested that few people were aware of the
Charter. Attempts to get people to identify key policy differences between
the Conservatives and Labour were also largely unsuccessful: ‘less than one
in ten gave any that were political (e.g. Labour believes in nationalisation)
as opposed to personal (e.g. Labour doesn’t keep promises)’. The report
appeared dismissive of answers that focused on general discussion of promise-
keeping and suggested they demonstrated a lack of political knowledge.82
A subsequent survey was conducted in 1948–9 asking people for their opi-
nions on Labour’s ‘Ask your Dad’ slogan, in the hope of future commissions
from Transport House. It appears to have been unsuccessful in this regard.
The survey indicated that most people were unfamiliar with the ‘Ask your
Dad’ slogan or unaware of its political connotations.83 The results did at
least suggest that Labour’s attacks on the record of the Conservative-
dominated National Government of the 1930s, which had been a core feature
of their 1945 campaign, were now being greeted with scepticism by many fru-
strated at the record of the Attlee government.84 By this time, Mass
Observation had to compete for the attention of Conservative Central Office
and Transport House with a number of survey organizations such as the
British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) and Research Services Ltd. The
1950 election acted as a key test of the appeal of these competing approaches,
with Mass Observation losing the battle for attention and credibility.
IV
Unlike its pre-war studies of elections in Lancashire and London, which it
planned to discuss at length in the uncompleted book ‘Politics and the non-
voter’, or its detailed study of the 1945 election, Mass Observation’s General
81 Ibid., p. 8.
82 ‘A report on the Industrial Charter’, Sept. 1947, FR 2516, pp. 8, 11. The reception of the
Industrial Charter is discussed in more detail in Andrew Taylor, ‘Speaking to democracy: the
Conservative party and mass opinion from the 1920s to the 1950s’, in Stuart Ball and Ian
Holliday, eds., Mass Conservatism: the Conservatives and the public since the 1880s (London, 2002),
pp. 78–99, at pp. 85–8.
83 Cowan, ‘The “progress of a slogan”’, p. 435.
84 In the Nuffield study’s sample of 1945 election addresses, it was noted that c. 60 per cent of
Labour candidates attacked the Conservatives’ interwar record, R. B. McCallum and Alison
Readman, The British General Election of 1945 (London, 1947), p. 102.
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Election survey of 1950 led to a publication. However, the eventual output,
Voters’ choice, lacked the detailed analysis to be found among the archived
book drafts and file reports generated by earlier election surveys. In part,
this was the result of it being a rushed publication featuring a mere twelve
pages of analysis. The 1950 election survey was designed ‘to sell to newspapers’
and ‘use as a post-election lever towards further political jobs’.85 In particular,
Mass Observation hoped to win future commissions from the Labour party.
Planning notes for the General Election survey suggested that Michael
Young, Labour’s director of research, should be contacted in case he wished
to add extra questions on commission (the Conservatives established their
own in-house inquiry into the campaign).86 Following completion of the
Mass Observation survey, it was decided to issue a short publication to attract
attention to the results.87 Labour had been returned with a slim majority of
five seats, so another election was likely in the near future. Nonetheless,
efforts to gain Michael Young’s attention failed.
Alexandre Campsie has indicated that Mass Observation researchers played
a prominent role in Labour policy work and academic sociology from the 1940s
onwards.88 Michael Young was central to the development of these networks,
providing a bridge between the social observation pioneered by MO, the emer-
ging field of community studies, and the politics of the New Left.89 Despite this,
Mass Observation’s particular tradition of election surveying effectively died
out in the early 1950s, as it struggled to find favour with the main parties’
research departments. Working in co-operation with Edward Shils, a sociolo-
gist based at the London School of Economics (LSE), Young was, in fact, instru-
mental in setting up a rival election survey in 1950. The Greenwich survey was
funded by Leonard Elmhirst, a long-time ally of Young, with whom he had
worked closely during his time at Political and Economic Planning.90 Mark
Abrams, the head of Research Services Ltd, who branded Mass Observation’s
methods as amateurish, was involved in initial discussions over the project
but the contract for fieldwork eventually went to the BIPO.91 Young described
these organizations in an internal party memorandum reflecting on the elec-
tion results as ‘the most reputable opinion survey organisations’.92
Mass Observation’s 1950 election survey interviewed 651 people across six
London constituencies that Labour had won from the Conservatives in
85 ‘Notes on 1950 election survey’, Jan. 1950, TC, 76-7-B/4697.
86 Ibid.
87 ‘Some notes on the preliminary publication of election material’, n.d., TC, 76-7-B/4772.
88 Alexandre Campsie, ‘Mass-Observation, left intellectuals and the politics of everyday life’,
English Historical Review, 131 (2016), pp. 92–121, at pp. 95–6.
89 Ibid., pp. 92–5, 108–10.
90 Raymond M. Lee, ‘“The man who committed a hundred burglaries”: Mark Benney’s strange
and eventful sociological career’, Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences, 51 (2015), pp. 409–33,
at p. 416.
91 Ibid., pp. 416–18; Mark Abrams, Social surveys and social action (London, 1951), pp. 105–13.
92 Michael Young, ‘General Election 1950. Notes on the findings of the public opinion polls’,
R.D.350/ April 1950, People’s History Museum, Manchester, Labour Party Archive (hereafter
LPA), B/F1950/1.
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1945.93 The surviving archival notes suggest a rather cursory level of analysis.
One employee drew up notes on a sample of 444 of the responses: ‘Wide
expression leaflets are no good, waste of paper, don’t convince anyone’, com-
ments that were paraphrased in the published report.94 Nonetheless, the
unpublished survey results offered a wide range of insights passed over in
Voters’ choice. Comments about ‘mud slinging’, which were such a feature of
the 1945 survey, rarely featured in 1950 – even though both parties traded
accusations about their opponents’ failure to keep their promises in office.95
While many respondents were critical of election literature, this was as
often the result of a sense that it did not provide sufficient detail about policy
or offered unrealistic promises, as the idea that it was a waste of paper.96
Typical comments included: (M42B) ‘Exactly what you would expect in election
leaflets – a lot of vague promises in the Labour leaflet. The Cons.[ervative] leaf-
let stated the case very fairly I thought’, (F25C) ‘Of course the Labour Party are
churning out all that old stuff about unemployment in the 30s rather than con-
sidering the unemployment that will be created if they carry on with their cur-
rent policies. The Conservative leaflet states the facts.’97
There were significantly more favourable observations about election litera-
ture recorded in the 1950 election survey than in 1945. Others who were crit-
ical of the party programmes indicated that they had read the literature
keenly, weighing it up against other sources of information. Comments
included: (M40D) ‘They are all quite well done – all present the reader with a
good case on the surface – so they have to be carefully sifted’, (M37B) ‘I prefer
to hear them at meetings. There are too many points missed in the manifestos
& literature’, (M34C) ‘Read most that’s been sent. They are none of them very
interesting. I’ve stuck to the newspapers for information about policy & the
broadcasts.’98
These critical comments about campaign literature tallied with the
Conservatives’ in-house opinion research. Churchill’s opening radio broadcast
appears to have received a much more sympathetic response than the
‘Gestapo’ speech of 1945 with praise for his ‘fair criticism’ and ‘no rash pro-
mises’. 99 However, after the party’s narrow defeat, an internal post mortem
93 ‘Notes on 1950 election survey’, Jan. 1950, TC, 76-7-B/4697.
94 Mrs Hingeley, ‘Notes on No 1-444’, in ‘Papers relating to the 1950 General Election survey’, TC,
76-7-B/4736; Mass-Observation, Voters’ choice, p. 6.
95 See the examples of Conservative leaflets in Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, Winston
Churchill papers, CHUR2/123. For Labour propaganda, see H. G. Nicholas, The British General
Election of 1950 (London, 1951), p. 213.
96 Several comments regarding ‘mud slinging’ and ‘waste of paper’ are underlined in the archive;
see for example, TC, 76-5-A (East Ham)/3056, 3119. Many of the ‘waste of time’ comments come
from one constituency, 76-5-D, Islington East.
97 TC, 76-5-B (Fulham East)/3192, 3205, 3207, see also TC, 76-5-A (East Ham)/3030, 3042. On the
parties’ respective promises, see also 3078, 3083–4.
98 TC, 76-5-C (Hendon North)/3335, 3396; TC, 76-5-F (Walthamstow East)/3800; see also TC,
76-5-A/3133-4.
99 Richard Toye, ‘Assessing audience reactions to Winston Churchill’s speeches’, in Jens
E. Kjeldsen, ed., Rhetorical audience studies and reception of rhetoric: exploring audiences empirically
(Basingstoke, 2018), pp. 85–107, at p. 102.
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suggested that some Tory voters felt that the manifesto of that year ‘was not
sufficiently explicit and that some of the wording appeared to be deliberately
vague’. It followed that future policy statements should be devised with atten-
tion to those ‘mistrustful and cynical’ electors who were on the alert ‘for sen-
tences which they can construe as being intentionally vague’. The document
urged the use of specific formulations such as ‘We can and will…’ and ‘We
are determined to…’ instead of ‘We want to see…’, ‘We would like to…’, etc.100
The Greenwich election study, organized by Mark Benney and a team at the
LSE, ultimately attracted more attention than Mass Observation’s work, provid-
ing the basis for a number of constituency-level election studies in the
1950s.101 Benney’s team drew on methods pioneered by MO but sought to
offer a more rigorous account of the effects of the campaign. Students
recorded audience reactions at meetings, the public display of election posters,
and the distribution of party literature –methods established by Tom
Harrisson.102 However, whereas MO relied on haphazard doorstep interviews
and a self-selecting volunteer panel, the Greenwich survey constructed a
panel of 900 people drawn at random from the electoral register. The
Greenwich panel members were interviewed up to three times by the BIPO,
showing how opinions changed during the campaign and in its aftermath,
an approach pioneered in the ‘Columbia’ study of Elmira, New York, during
the 1948 US Presidential Election.103 Michael Young discussed the Greenwich
survey at length in the Labour’s Research Department’s analysis of opinion
polling, along with the wider work of the BIPO and Research Services Ltd,
who were all praised for their thorough attention to creating a representative
sample base. The rival work of Mass Observation was overlooked.104
The authors of the Greenwich study stressed that most of the public was
politically uninformed and took little interest in elections. Almost half of
their respondents claimed they were ‘not very interested’ in politics, around
a third said they were ‘moderately interested’, only 10 per cent stated they
were ‘very interested’.105 Some of the evidence which the Greenwich survey
collected does not seem to accord with this claim, for example, one in five dis-
played window-cards in favour of a particular candidate in the days leading up
100 Public Opinion Research Department, ‘Confidential supplement to Public Opinion Summary
No. 14’, 5 Mar. 1950, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CPA, CCO 4/3/249; for the wider activities of the
department, see Andrew Taylor, ‘“The record of the 1950s is irrelevant”: the Conservative party,
electoral strategy and opinion research, 1945–64’, Contemporary British History, 17 (2003), pp. 81–110,
at pp. 83–7.
101 Mark Benney, A. P. Gray, and R. H. Pear, How people vote: a study of electoral behaviour in
Greenwich (London, 1956); R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, Straight fight: a study of voting behaviour
in the constituency of Bristol North-East at the General Election of 1951 (London, 1954); R. S. Milne and
H. C. Mackenzie, Marginal seat 1955: a study of voting behaviour in the constituency of Bristol
North-East at the General Election of 1955 (London, 1958).
102 William L. Miller, ‘Electoral systems, elections and public opinion’, in Brian Barry, Archie
Brown, and Jack Hayward, eds., The British study of politics in the twentieth century (Oxford, 1999),
pp. 223–56, at p. 237.
103 Lee, ‘“The man who committed a hundred burglaries”’, p. 417.
104 Young, ‘General Election 1950. Notes on the findings of the public opinion polls’.
105 Benney, Gray, and Pear, How people vote, pp. 23–5, 125.
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to the poll. Moreover, little sense was given of the means by which people self-
defined their levels of interest in politics.106 Regardless of how credible its
claims about the public’s interest in politics appear in retrospect, this early
example of ‘electoral sociology’ was a trailblazer, doing much to shape under-
standings of how elections operated in the 1950s and beyond. This was an
approach which linked voting behaviour to class identity, downplaying the
importance of the documentary forms of campaigning in shaping voting
behaviour.107
V
British politics underwent a dramatic series of upheavals between 1937 and 1950
but the ways in which people discussed why they voted for a particular party, or
decided not to vote at all, remained largely constant. Mass Observation’s election
surveys indicate that people judged parties largely on valence issues, assessing
whether parties had a credible programme and had kept their past promises.
Sensational appeals or ‘mud slinging’ were to be distrusted, and were widely
seen as a means of hiding the deficiencies of the candidate’s programme. If elec-
tion observers in the 1940s recorded that many people were distrustful of poli-
ticians, this should come as no surprise, as the broken promises of the past had
long been used to attack opponents. The failures of the Lloyd George govern-
ment, the Labour administration of 1929–31, and the ‘Guilty Men’ of the
Hungry Thirties were a staple feature of electioneering long after the leaders
of those administrations had fallen from office.108
After 1918, many commentators expressed concerns about the apparent
apathy of much of the new electorate. Mass Observation found that many
were unaware of key policy initiatives such as the Industrial Charter and
expressed frustrations at both the record of the National Government of
1931–45 and Attlee’s Labour government which followed it. Nonetheless, we
should not confuse anger at the failings of the governing parties and their
opponents, or hostility to particular forms of campaigning, with indifference
to politics. This was an age in which programmatic politics flourished.
Election manifestos grew in importance after 1918 given that parties were
increasingly expected to lay out their plans for government in detail.
Hundreds of thousands of copies of manifestos were distributed.109 The
106 Ibid., p. 89.
107 For a critique of the BIPO’s methodology, see Mark Roodhouse, ‘“Fish-and-chip intelligence”:
Henry Durant and the British Institute of Public Opinion, 1936–63’, Twentieth Century British History,
24 (2013), pp. 224–48, at pp. 226, 235–43. On the influence of electoral sociology in the 1950s and
early 1960s, see David Thackeray and Richard Toye, Age of promises: electoral pledges in twentieth cen-
tury Britain (Oxford, 2021), pp. 10–12; Laura Beers, ‘Whose opinion? Changing attitudes towards
opinion polling in British politics, 1937–1964’, Twentieth Century British History, 17 (2006),
pp. 177–205, at pp. 191ff, 197, 199–203; Taylor, ‘“The record of the 1950s is irrelevant”’, pp. 81–92.
108 Clare Griffiths, ‘Broken promises and the remaking of political trust: debating reconstruction
in Britain during the Second World War’, in David Thackeray and Richard Toye, eds., Electoral pledges
in Britain since 1918: the politics of promises (Basingstoke, 2020), pp. 95–115.
109 In spite of problems caused when a government printing order supervened, nearly 1.3 mil-
lion copies of Let us face the future were distributed, ‘General Election, July, 1945: report on
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evidence collected by Mass Observation suggests that many people weighed
the claims in the competing manifestos carefully, either by reading the ori-
ginal texts or by following coverage of them on the radio or in the press.
We should be cautious in using Mass Observation’s election surveys to
explain the changing fortunes of the main political parties. After 1945, these
surveys were confined to London and the surrounding region. However,
what seems most striking in reading through these surveys is how unremark-
able Let us face the future appeared in 1945, certainly compared to the attacks
that were made on the broadly similar programme outlined in Your Britain in
1937. These conclusions support Laura Beers’s argument that Labour’s triumph
owed much to its ability to use literature to present its programme as attract-
ive and credible.110 MO had found that Your Britain appealed to many voters in
Farnworth and Fulham in 1938, suggesting that Labour’s triumph in 1945 was
built on the roots of its pre-war work. Labour also undoubtedly benefited from
hostility to the National Government’s record after 1940 and widespread
enthusiasm for social reform.111 It was to be a fragile triumph. Both the ‘Ask
your Dad’ survey and the MO 1950 General Election survey indicated a
widespread sense that Labour had betrayed its mandate and was relying on
worn-out tales of the miseries of the 1930s rather than offering an appealing
programme for the future. But if Labour struggled to hold onto power, it had
still managed to change the rules of the game, as its rivals felt obliged to
centre their campaigning around a detailed programme for change.112
By the early 1950s, Mass Observation’s rivals were producing election stud-
ies, focused on quantitative research and opinion polling, which attracted
greater attention from party research departments and the wider public.
These studies tended to stress popular disengagement from politics and
emphasized the role of class in determining voting behaviour.113 This approach
was echoed in contemporary Nuffield studies. In 1951, David Butler, drawing on
the results of recent election surveys, argued that few people took an interest
in campaign literature, with probably no more than 5 per cent of people read-
ing the party manifestos.114 The evidence collected in Mass Observation’s elec-
tion surveys does not support such conclusions. From the late 1930s onwards,
Tom Harrisson had sought to demonstrate that the apparent apathy of much of
the electorate was the result of the main parties’ failure to present their pol-
icies in an appealing manner. There were, however, signs that parties were
making strides to address this problem, as indicated by the success of the
Your Britain pamphlets. The large print runs of manifestos, and the attention
campaign publicity services’, 23 July 1945, 1945 election file, LPA. Labour printed 920,000 copies of
its 1950 manifesto, ‘General Election campaign: head office service’, 22 Mar. 1950, B/F1950/1, LPA.
110 Laura Beers, ‘Labour’s Britain, fight for it now!’, Historical Journal, 52 (2009), pp. 667–95.
111 Ross McKibbin, Parties and people: England 1914–1951 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 130, 138–9.
112 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Thackeray and Toye, ‘An age of promises’,
pp. 3, 10, 20–1.
113 Mark Benney and Phyllis Geiss, ‘Social class and politics in Greenwich’, British Journal of
Sociology, 1 (1950), pp. 310–27; Samuel J. Eldersveld, ‘British polls and the 1950 General Election’,
Public Opinion Quarterly, 15 (1951), pp. 115–32, at pp. 127–8.
114 D. E. Butler, The British General Election of 1951 (London, 1952), pp. 3–4, 52.
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lavished on them in campaigning, suggest that Butler underestimated their
significance (even if most people did not read them in their original form).
As Mass Observation’s surveys indicate, much of the public took an interest
in weighing up the competing programmes of the parties. The broken promises
of the past may have made them wary about pledges for future action but this
was no age of apathy.
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